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FOREWORD
BY PROFESSOR BENJAMIN FARRINGTON
This series of booklets was begun in 1943, the sixtieth anniversary of the death of Mant, as a tribute to his memory by British
Marxists. The aim of the series is not so much to exmund
the classics of ~ a r x i s mas to offer a Marxist comment&v on
contemporary problems. Marxism has a contribution to make
to world reconstruction. The world cannot be rebuilt except
on the basis of democracy. Democracy does not mean only
, freedom from want, from disease, from fear; it means also the
widest possible extension of intellectual freedom. Democracy
,mquir& that every man has not only the right and duty t-o
,. labor for the common'good but also the right and duty to
think for the common good. For the achievement of this
end Marxism is a mighty engine. Where else in the world
s h d we find such faith in science, such faith in knowledge,
such faith in reason, and so earnest an endeavor to expand
their sway? These essays, .written by ~arxists,are a contribut i o to
~ the creation of confidence among men in their ability
'
to control their own destiny. The writers are fortunate in
that they employ a tongue which has a long and honorable
tradition of expressing the most difficult-subjectswithout jargon
or pedantry. They have tried to be worthy of this tradition.
- It is their further good fortune that this tongue enables them
also to communicate directly with their brothers
in the United
,
States of America.
J

'

.
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I., Does It Matter What a Mah Believes?

Philosophy has been supposed to be a purely academic pursuit of no possible heres\.to the man of action, the speculative
activity of curious minds with nothing better to do. A disiin@shed scientist says, '-'Philosophy may be described as argument about things of which we are ignorant." Its subject matter
is supposed by many to be that which lies beyond everyday experience and is therefore in iti very nature either unknowable
or nonexistent.
others regard philosophy as the pursuit of pure G t h by pure
mind, an activity of great, indeed, of the highest importance,
but on a different and loftier plane than everyday life,.which is
concerned with mGerial affairs. Thus Dr. Tudor Jones, dis-'
cussing contemporary German philosophy in the year 1935,
says: "In spite of the chaos that now exists in Germany in the
political, social and religious life, -thereare still men who have
not bowed the knee to Baal, but6have proceeded with their
p&losophical thoughts ar if nothing had happened." (Our
italics.) An activity so utterly remote from the problems and
. demands of reaislifemight well be considered to be fudle, and
quite beyond the interest of ordinary folk.
- But as a matter of fact the,man in the street has more philosophical notions in his head than he knows and they affect
both his thinking and his actions. It has been well said that "we
have no choice whether we shall form philosophieti for ourselves, only the choice whether we shall do,so consciously and.
in accord with*some intelligible principle or ~copsciously
and at random." The man who is contemptuous of philosophy
may be merely a man with ad unexamined philosophy, whose
assumpti~nsare unc;itically held and many of whose judgments
are prejudices. "The unexamined life," said Socrates, "is not
,
- worth living," and an unexamined philosophy may prove to
be equglly unsatisfactory.
- A moment's reflection revears the extent to which modern
thinking is saturated with unexamined and usually false philo- sophical notions. It is not difficult to t-e
their origin back to
traditional modes of thought which were the consciously held
and taught philosophies of y'esterday or to the-writers; jour'

'

1

nali~t~~broadcasters,
lecturers, preachers and teachers of our '
own day, some of them philosophers, 'oth-ers popularizers of
other men's philosophies, while the rest reflect, in many cases
more than they realize, the current philosophies of the time.
Eventually discussion and conversation spread these ideas
more widely still until the man in the railway train is heard '
declaring that science no longer believes in matter, the wife
by the fireside argues that instinct is more to be,trusted than
reason, and the Brains Trust, despite the protests of Prof,. J. D.
Bernal, informs a credulous world that there is a lot to be'said
for spooks.
At first glance these common beliefs may seem to be quite
unimportant, but their social significance is greater than appears. As Bernal pointed out on the occasion mentioned above,
it is significant that an immense increase in superstition characterized the decline of ancient Rome and now accompanies the
disintegration of our own civilization. The ~ u l of
t unreason
has been one of the diseases of the\ fascist mind in Germany
and Italy and reflects a deliberate turning back to barbarism,
the repudiation of the rational and scientific approach to the
world, The renewed belief in mentalism, the theory that mind
is the fundamental stuff of the universe and that matter is
secondary or even unreal, is a view which crops up as the philosophical background of many reactionary attitudes .and.much
social pessimism.
Now all-these apparently trivial and certainly loosely hdd
views really stem from philosophical positions .of far greater
importance and complekity, from systems of philosophy, which
merit careful enquiry. Moreover they will mostly be found,
on examination, to be forms of what is known as Idealism, or to be closely allied to and dependent upon idealist
views. It is therefore important that we should clearly under+standexactly what is meant by idealism. ~hiloso~hiCa11~
it is
not used in any of the popular senses either to describe an outlook on life which is blind to facts as they are, or a determination to think the best of one's fellows, or a life ruled by Sdeals.
The philosophical doctrine is a theory of reality in terms of
, "ideas." The matter has been clearly put by Engels :"The great
basic question of all philosophy, especially of modern philos- ,

-

...

ophy, is that concerning the reiation of thinking and being.
The answers which the philosophe~sgave to this question split
them into two great camps. Those who asserted the primacy of
spirit to nature,. comprised the camp of idealism. The others
who regarded nature as primary, belong to the various schdols
of materialism."
A modern philosopher defines it as the
.
view that "mind alone
is real and material bodies are in some sense to be regarded as
states of, or elements in, consciousness."
. The fundamental principle is that matter is not the final
reality, so that the actual world of nature tends to appear trivial
and GimPOrtant, or at any rate derivative and -secondary.
Many idealists bebeve that "Reality" lie$ beyond the material
worfd,'as a rational and perfect system to be contrasted with
the irrationality and imperfection of the world as experienced.
Idealists also believe that mind or spirit is the creative force in
the world. Not only did Spirit precede and create the material
/world, but in life and history men lay hold of ideas, which are
right and true in themselves, and proceed to apply them-to the
world, making or re-making the world according to these
principles.
We shall shortly see what forms this philosophy takes in our
time and what significance it has for a world passing through
olie of its great periods of transformation.
Marxism is itself a philosophy and its criticism of idealism
is of course philosophical. It does not adopt the merely philistine point of view which brushes philosophy aside as "argument
aboit things of which we are ignorant," or futile speculation,
nor does it adopt a position of naive realism or common sense,
the attitude of Dr. Johnson who when asked how he proposed
to refute idealism said, striking his foot against a great stone,
, "I refute it thus." Both Marx and Engels were trained philosophers whose own position was a development rather than a
wholesale repudiation of curfent philosophy, Engels said,"Those
who abuse philosophy most are slaves to-precisely the worst
vulgrized relics of the worst philosophers." Elsewhere he spoke
of the importance of "learning to assimilate the results of the
developmint of philosophy &ring the past two and a hal£
thousand years." Plekhanov, the Russian Marxist and the
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the study. d.
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teacher of.ltnin, was an &ble
philosophical works Lenin. regarded as indispensable.
and his
'own mind was naturally
reading was-systematicand unusually dcient. If his one gr-t'
philosophical wo& M a t d m and Empirio-Cir'dcism is not, .
always appreciated it is because most of those who u y to read .
it are totally mawarc of the irrationalist philosophi& which
it criticizes,
M a r e m is a claissical development of European philosophy, ;
a revoIudonized Hegelianism. It is far 'fromtreating idealism .'.?
.wi&contempt. Idealism has its origin in a more critical ac..
count of human knowledgi. It shows, rightly, the extreme" :, :
difliculty of knowing exactly what the objects of experience .';
- really are. Now this criticism of our knowledge of the ejrtenigl, . .
warld is not nonsense; it is the first step 'from :vulgar,philis-.
+tinismto a more rational and scientific understanding of -man,
and his relation to nature. The understanding of
all .our knowledge is and of the important
whether we can know anything at all without
rqatter.of importance. Idealism is a reaction
belief in an abrupt presentation of physical things to the mindc .:'
as if they could be known for what they are as simply as a
phdtographic plate records a picture. It errs when, going.bevorid . > , ,
this, it denies the independent eltistence ,of th
ception or asserts that we inore really know
or m d states &an any objects beyond them.
'
' We cannot do without the contribution which idealism has . :
made to our understanding of the world bu
.neither can we do CKith idealism as a
I;enin says that it is,only its me-sidedn
alism. "Philosophical idealism is nonse
point, of a crude, simple and metaphysic
contrary from the standpoint of
sophical idealism is 'a one-sided,
ment of one of the characteristic as
edge." This aspect of knowledge is
.
the knbwer and to the conditions of knowing.
Whilp accepting this "characteris&caspect or limit of howl-. -;
edge"-which idealism has established, .Marxism, and of .tome-. .-i
r .-q
,
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many$&er phiioso~ s;. re$cts the
exaggeration of relativity into a doubt'as to the ,&stqnce of an
'idcfepdent.world, which is characteristic df much idealism,
:. and asserts instiad what we may call the axiom ofiadependent
not:only Marxism but
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keality. As Prichard states it, "Knowledge unconditionally presupposes that the reality known exists independently mf the
knowledge of it, and that we know it as it exists in this
independence."
Marxism, therefore, does not Aatly refute idealism as though
the 'whole id&t
movement from Descartes to Hegel had been a preposterous error. --It does not brush Plato and his
. di~iplcs
on one side. So far from engaging in a head-on Icdlipion in, the Johnsonian style, .as is the manner of the crude
,-$gaterialist,it absorbs even while i t criticizes, it includes e v b
. while it tmmcends'the idealist philosophy. In other words i t s
whole attitude is dialectical.

,
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11. Idealism and Its Ref tctation
/.

..

'

- .;philosophywhich are taking a very definite place in the modern

,

1

mind, it is nec~saryto clear up theewhole muddle about the
.theory that each mind perceives nothing but its own men61
*.~'-s&tes. once'we -have done so, and not before, the errors'of
.
our contemporaries can be successfully disposed of.
i When a hard, square, red object, suih as a brick, is per. . . ceived, we are perceiying a collection of qualities, and' we ,
-. usually believe that thk object, the brick in this case, is that
which bar these qualities. But all such qualities are only known
to-us as .mental experiences of .color and the like. The red
'
i - patch is &ally, for bur minds,!a sense experience,^ not a brick.
If. we smell acrosewe really smell ah odor, and that too -is a &s
experience. Even the hardness and shape are tactile ex"imces.
Let us call what we actually experience sensedata.
It is de;lr that what we normally do is to interpret the sense.-, data as qualities of concrete objects and we say that we percdt,~
I
, 'the brick by sensing its qualities. The quality,' we believe,
,
r q ~ r e as substance in which to inhere.
.But d k i t ? The whole noddn of substance'is a myth, says ...
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. '~efbredealing with certain recent developments of idealist
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the idealist. rhe thing is dotnmg more man the sum or its
qxpm*mcidqualities. There can be no pssible proof of anything else. But since all qualities reside only in percipient
minds, the object itself must do 'the same. In brief, the object
is of the nature of an idea.
If that is so the idea of a brick is not different from the idea
of beauty, or squareness or God. They are all mentally real,
but not real in any other way.'Nor is a brick more real than
squareness, or squareness less real than-a brick.
But the plain man at once points out ;1significant difference?,
Not all ideas have the same status. Some are vividly and persistently held in our minds, as if these qualities inhered in some
object before us, others are less objective, they are merely our
ideas. The idealist grants this at once; He does not deny the ,
existence of objects which insist on being k n o m and which
are persistently there. All that he is out to deny is that an
experience of this kind requires a mdhaZ universe. The experience~he argues, is not necessarily an experience of knowing
a mutenal world. It is only a peculiar kind of experience. It
is still something mental. The real problem is what can be the
origin of such an experience, if not a material object? But
since, even if matter existed, it is rather hard to imagine how
it would get across to something so different from itself as
mind, why should not something m m t d be the cause of our
experiences of collections of qualities?
Idealists differ considerably as to what mental or "ideal" origin '
.
there might be for our perceptions. Bishop Berkeley, one of
R'
the ablest and the first of the modern idealists. held that the
t
objects we perceive, not being of our own making, have their
j
cause, but that cause is not matter, but God. The only realities, . - ?r
then, are God, other spirits created by Him, and the various :
ideas or experiences which He has ordained to be apprehended
in certain regular sequences. Idealism, :however, need not,beEeve in God, and may instead simply rest in the ideal or
', .
mental character of all reality.
It will be seen that the upshot of the discussion is to disprove
the existence of a material world and to suggest -&at the whole
experienced universe is of the same nature as the mind. If
that is the -case, materialism is refuted and the principal objec%
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tion to a religibus explanation of the universe is removed. And
that is precisely what the founder of modern idealism, Bishop

*

*Berkeley, intended. And very often it is precisely what our
modern idealists haie in mind as well.'
Now what is b e reply? To strike a great stone with the
foot and say "I refute it thus" is only to show that the theory
has never even been understood.
.We must do better than that. The refutation is-simpler than
might be supposed. When the idealist says that it is only our
bwn mental states that we know, or that we certainly know
them better than we know anything else, he is laboring under
a misconception. Of course to know a-thing is to have an idea
of it but that does not mean that you only know the idea. Because you cannot be conscious of the material world without
thinking about it, it does not follow that all you are conscious
of is your thinking! The fact that a known thing must, as an
element of knowledge, be classed as an idea only means that
when a thing is known it occupies a new relationship-the
relationship of being known. But in thus assuming the status
of an idea, as well as a material object, it does not by any means
become identified with it. The object does not become an idea
and nothing but an idea. Therefore whatever is known is not
just because it is thought about, itself of the nature of mind.
The idealist has not yet proved his case, and it is up to him to
prove that material objects 'do not exist. The burden of proof
is not on the believer in material reality to' prove that they do.
Let us put the matter -a little differently. The idealist confuses the thing apprehended with the act of apprehension. A
thought of a thing must be in the mind, but the thing of
which we are aware is not in the mind, and is therefore not
mental. We thus vindicate a common sense attitude to reality.
So far from mental experience shutting us up to pure subjectivism mind is essentially that which possesses the characteristic of becoming acquainted 'with things other than itself.
The idealists treat knowing ih a way which flatly traverses our
experience. As Whitehead says, "This experience knows away
from and beyond our 'own personality-it is not a knowledge
about our own personality." Moreover it is not a passive perception of an un-get-at-able world, as if the observer were

,

-

-

lacated in one ot those glass observatton chambers sunk 1n
9.
Knowledge is for' action and tesults in action, and ac
means passing beyond thc self into the world. That is
Lenin said that "to ask outside the realm
the objective truth corresponds to human
cism."* It is the success of our actions, argues Engels, that proves
the correspondence of our perception with the objective nature
of the objects perceived. "Practice ought to be the first and
fundamental criterion of the theory of kn
Thue are purely mental experiences but they are
own .to be such by not standing up to the test of action. We
rightly, call them7llusions. If, on the other hand, an
ence allows us to act upon it, chects what was pure1
(i.e. illusory) by some sharp reaction or verifies

y began to produce them
'thing-in-itself became a '
tinual interaction betwe
f his knowledge. What
sfully. If his knowledge
irect, his action is unsucc
strous. Moreover, succes
ation and brings new facts
have to observe carefully and learn to kno
ge immediately requires a new kind
tion and so the process goes on.
Thus experience bears out the fact tha
'
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being locked up in the world of our -own ideas., On &e m
;
vary we .are always finding out things, about the world, out-'
- side us and adjustiag ourselves by action to its requirements.
Objectivity is of the essence of the experience.
"It must, hbwevu, be carefully nqed just zuha is refuted. '
. It is subjectivism, mentalism, that is the mistake.
But the recognition that our knowledge of things at any
, - one time is not final and absolute, but relative, is not a mistake
This,.is a fact of the greatest importance, a fact unknown to
the older materialists, and ignored by the uncritical. -What
,
idealism bequeath= to us as a permanent heritage, is what
. Unin c&
the dialectical elmtent in e now ledge, the recogni- tion of the relqtivity of all knowledge, of the fact that it is
'1 strictly conditioned, that what we know of it d e w & on,a
multitude of particular circumstances. This is the truth be ,
hind the fact that we perceive only through sense-data. We
- perceive objccti, but the qualities of obj&ts are conditioned in
all manner of ways. Qualities do not merely h h q e in substances but are given in the relationship of the observer to the
object. That possibility is only realized under conditions, and
, 'not only the object but what the conditions are determine what .
. the qualities are.
yet once again we must.bektre of one-sidedness, of falling
'/overbackwards into a complete denial df o b j d v e truth and
the wastion that all we know are fictions or symbols mated
by our orvn minds. However relative our knowledge to the
conditions under which we know, whatever properties and .
, laws we discover are really there and a& as accurately recorded
aS the circumstances allow. The iesults are true w far as they
.
-go, This is less than ,naive realism claims when it asserts that
.
.': :& know objects as they really. and completely are lh
thi;
s e k , but very much more than is allawed by sceptical idealism ,which declares that we cannot be sure of anything at &
outside
of our own mental states. In other words eich r b r d e d
:*,
. ''.ob~?ation and discovery is a step forward to absolute objective knowledge.. The step of our advancing science are par.'
tid-and limited, but they advance into fuller and fuller truth.
.
Now .we have hitherto been discussing only our knowledge
"
aad'its
*onditions. But it 'is already obvious that we cannot
- .I
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separate (though we can distinguish) knowledge and its object. When we say that under certain conditions of temperature and light a certain substance is a colorless fluid, we are
stating the-limits of our knowledge at that moment and at
the same time describing the object, not absolutely, but relatively. If we lower the temperature the same substanEe may
become hard and opaque.
This extends the limits of our
knowledge and adds new properties, under new conditions, to
, the object. This is a very simple example but both modern
science and modern philosophy are at one with Marxism in
stressing *the great truriabillity and the infinite potentiality of
things, which are not neat bundles of fixed qualities, but everchanging complexes G t h explosive
and a great
range of properties, only few of which we at present know.
'So that we no longer say: This is a hard, square, red object,
but: This is an object which to me, in this particular light, at
this particular temperature, from here is a square, red object,
and, in relation to what I am scratching it with, it is hard.
That, of course, is simple enough. But it is not quite so simple when you begin to organize things into different patterns
or combinations. Suddenly entirely new and unpredictable
properties emerge. Chemical compounds have quite different
properties from the elements which combine to form them.
Hydrogen is a gas, oxygen is a gas, but their combination in
.certain proportions is water. Organic substances have quite
different properties from inorganic and yet may be synthesized
from the inorganic. Protoplasm performs a synthesis which
we cannot as yet perform in the laboratory; it builds organic
substances first into proteins and then into protoplasm which
then exhibits the characteristics of life-it respires, it reproduces
itself, it moves, it excretes, it responds to s6mul&.
Life is simply the
of a particular pattern or combination of previously non-living parts, but its reality -and
novelty are undeniable.
T h e relativity principle thus becomes the ,principle of emergence, the principle of the infinite potentiality of matter. It
completely shatters the older materialist view that matter was
a limited and almost altogeth,er known affair which was certainly predictable in all its relations and as certainly incapable
A

I

F

*

1
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of the transition frbm non-living to living. Now in so far as
idealism insistssthat we do not know anything completely but
only under 'the peculiar1f.-limited conditions of each particulai
experience of knowing, it helps us, without mentalism or
magic, to loosen up-the rigidities of an earlier materialism.
But once a h i n note that this is a statement about our knowledge and not only about matter. "So far ar I @zow," we must
always say, "such and such is the case, or such and such are
the properties of this thing." Every statement of knowledge
m-t be thus qualified. We can no longer say that we know
, anything unconditionally. Knowledge, we see, is not a "reading off' of the specification of an object, but a statement of the
result of a particular relationship between the knower and the
known at a particular moment and under the unique condi. tions oft that moment. Knowing is a two-way business in
. which the way I approach 'what I know, what I do in order
to h d out what it is, the conditions of my knowing, are quite
as important as what the object is in itself.

III. The Refitation of Mechanistic Materialinn
-

-

A position almost identical with that of idealism has been
reached by certain physiological materialists. Bertrand Russell,
far instance, who is thoroughly idealist in his philosophy,
nevertheless employs crude materialist arguments. These
philosophies point out that our only evidence for the existence
of an eternal wqrld is .given by certain sensations which are
themselves the result of nervous currents activating certain
cells in the brain. These nerve currents are set up by purely
physical stimuli, of heat, wave motion, pressure, applied to
certain nerve, endings in the skinj-eye,ear and so forth. Now
we have no reason at all to assume that the mental end-eflect
produced by a brain cell at the end of a long chain of physical
or physiological events is in any way like the original stimulus;
any more than the explosion of a cartridge is like the finger
which pressed the trigger. The physiology of the human body
and the brain, it is argued, shuts us up to mental md-eflects.
"Everything that we'can directly observe of the physical world,"
says krtrand Russell, "happens inside our heads and consists
\

-

,

.
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if

of mental eirenk. The development this point of view
lead us to the conclusion that the distinction between mind
and ,maiter is illusory." Thus a purely materialistic view ends
as something indistinguishable from idealism+tn inter- .
esting example, by the way, of the Marxist law of a thing
passing over into its opposite.+ But by a curious inconsistency,
as Whitehead has pointed out, these same people who express
themselves. as though bodies, brains and nerves were the-~nly
real things in an entirdy imaginary world base all their evi- dence on the experimenters' perception of another person's
body. But our evidence for the bodies we experiment upon
. . and diss'kct in order to build up our science of physiology is
of exactly the same type as, but weaker than, our evidence for
the external world we are asked to deny. These materialists
are treating bodies on materialist principles in order to treat
ail the rest of the wosld*\onidealist principles and it won't do;
An excellent example, we may remark, of what Bosanquet
called "the meeting of extremes in contemporary philosophy."
- We have already indicated the reply. If we are quite sure
that these end-effects are obtained by a physical stimulus falling on a specific nerve-ending or sense oigan which can be
f d l y described, as of course can the physical stimulus and its
organ, if we are quite sure about the optic and
sensory
nerves which we have dissected put and experimented with,
add of the brain with its nerve cells, localized functiops, visual
andeauditory areas, etc., d l the result of endless 'experihents,
we are surely pretty certain about the existence of at any. rate
that quch of the external world, and if we find no reason

'

-

'

doubtthat,whydoubttherest?
But the argument is, from the o
. Bishop Berkeley all over again. It is
mcnt for mentalism but a philosophical
we have .already replied.

I

*.& Lenin said, dialectic is' the "teaching of
are identical
how they tutn into each other,
turning into the other." Engels, too, has spoken
in* one another's direction." This position, h
mth the,more limited and abstract notion that opposites

...
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To the biologist no such doubts as to the existence o
ternal world are likely to occur because, unless he is a very
ad biologist, he is concerned all the time not with a dead
specimen on a dissecting board, in fwhos~
anatomy tie is interested, but with a 'living organism functioning in an external
environment, adapted to that environment and constantly reacting to it. The biologist works on two major assumptions,
firstly that the animal is aware of its environment and has a
most elaborate apparatus of sense organs' and responsive
mechanisms to keep it aware and to make swift reaction possible; secondly, he assqes that his organisms do function id
relation to a real world and do know a great deal of it, enough
of it to react satisfactorily, and survive. In fact if an animal
erminate its existence.
The biologist also believes that while even his most primitiv
organisms possess-this awareness and power of response, the
most complex, including mammals and man, have developed
awareness and response to an altogether amazing degree.
Moreover, he*knows that in the case 'of man, we have not only
a very subtle and skilful control of behavior in relation to en-

No biologist, except when he is thinking philosophically and
inking a wrong philosophy, is either a mentalist denying
the external world or a mechanistic materialist. For him an
animal exists in relation to a real environment and reacts with
through awareness and the power to know it.
The significance of the biological approach is immense.
at one and-the same time a refutation of idealism and a
refutation of that form of materialism which excludes mind
from the universe. Constrained by its own subject matter, i
own experience and experiment, the science of biology blds to

/

gether what man has too often put asunder, mind and matter.
The materialist who, believing only in the physiological
mechanism leading to brain events, so surprisingly ends up as
an idealist does not, of course, anticidate that this will Drove
He sets out to prove
is nothing properly
which is limited to predictable
For him, if consciousness
cast by the brain or in
' some other way consistent with &e complete dependence.-of .
.mind on matter. Consciousness, inm
s-et
a product
without -consequences,as a chalk mark left bv drawing with a
piece of chalk on a board is ah effect left by ;he Dassage of the' Chalk but has, as a mark, no effect itself 06 the khalkYnor the , hand which moves the chalk.
This for most materialists is
the .conclusion of the argiment and it is the classical positioof what is often called mechanistic materialism but more generally 'known simply as the materialist philosophy.
Marxism has always strenuously opposed this form of materialism on the ground that it is in flat contradiction of the
.-to chemis
evidence to reduce life and consciousness
ism does not deny w o = i X e r life or min
t asserts,
Marxhowever, -that they are functions of highly organized matter
on the organic level. "Every level of organization," says Needham, f'has its own regularities and pri~ciples,not reducible .to
those appropriate to lower levels of organization, nor applicable
to higher levels, but at the same time in no way inscrutable or
immune from scientific analysis or comprehension." 'Therefore the levels of life a i d A n d are noi reducible to ~hvsics
and chemistry but are unique, with their own specid ihar, acteristics, modes of behavior and laws.
I But the Marxist does not attribute these 's~en'alcharactenistics
to $he inftdsion of a vital principle into mdtter from the realm
of mind or spirit. He claims that in the realm of nature are to
series.
be found &f$erent organizational levels in an ascen"From ultimate physical particle to atom, from atom to moleaggregate, from aggregate to
animal
organ to %from
of organizational levels is
A
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complete." Just as life in its simplest form is characteristic of
the -mlloidal aggregation of proteins' known as protoplasm,
and has the alt&'&ther new power in nature of synthesizing
new protoplasm from oFganic acids, so protoplasm organized
iii a living cell follows this power of organic growth with the
new Dowers of re~roduction, of self-repair, of response to
stimdus. At a hig6er level still, specializeh cells concern themselves wholly wi& registering impressions from the environment and bringing about the -activation of muscles which
secures an appropriate response. These nerves are called: receptors and iffectors. in all^ a complex organization of nerve
cells is interposed between receptors and effectors, first .to provide a multitude of alternative associations, like a telephone
exchange, but ultimately 'to think about the situation revealed
by the receptors, in order that the effect or discharge may
bring about considered, problem-solving action. 'In other
words, when matter is organized in nerves it feels and acts,
when matter is organized in a brain it thinks. Thought, mind,
is not a substance added to the matter, it is a function of a certain kind of matter. This is a conclusion as perfectly in harmony with biological science as mechanistic materialism is in
' contradiction to it. It is, of course, a view held not only by
Marxists but by mdt, if not all, professional biologists and by
an increasing number of philosophers with a real knowledge
of biology.
.
- The mechanistic materialist has formulated his position in
an honest endeavor to be -true to scientific pinciples, to seek
out scientific causes, not to multiply entitiei and fall back in
every case of difficulty upon the supernatural. He is above all
things in violent reaction from vitalism, which injects a living
force into matter to 'explain life. He is fundamentally opposed
to the theory -of the interaction of two completely disparate
entities-mind and body.
All this is wrfectlv correct and even in this narrow and
somewhat rigid form; materialism has broadened the field of
science, firmly established the scientific method and done much
to over&row obscurantism and superstition.
But the mechanist in banishing mind from the universe be&uSsehe iannot accept the interaction of mind and matter,
y
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rV. 3 fie Delusion of Dualism
I

The reason is a simple one. Both mechanistic materialism
and idealism derive from an unnatural splitting of the uni.verse into disparate realities, mind and matter. This took
p l a q in cermin historical conditions plhich we cannot go into,
under the influence of the French philosopher Descartes
(1637). Descartes set science on its feet by showing that (from
one point of view) the universe is extended substance (occupying space) and exhaustively comprehended.in the terms of
mathematics. "Give me extension and motion," he said, "and
I will construct the universe." But how, in that case, account
for mind? Descartes held that mind also exists, but it cannot
interact with matter since it does' not occupy space. Thus arose
,that strange philosophical bifurcation of the universe which
has not been overcome down to our own day. It had two
opposite consequences. On the one hand science went ahead
and by the immense success df its purely mathematical approach, and just because it ruled out the supernatural, achieved
considerable victories. Its followers dropped the idealism of
Descartes. They could ,do without the realm of pure spirit.
. It was entirely superfluous. On the other hand, those who,
based their thinking on Descartes' proofs of the existence of
--purespirit, soon found they had no need for matter. They be+
came pure idealists.
Thus there came into existence two opposing philosophies,
materialism and idealism, each. of which really implied the
other. They were the two halves of an indissoluble whole.
The materialist has stripped the universe of mind, but he has
'not got rid of it. He cannot. It is, if not the skeleton, at any
/rate the ghost in his cupboard, and it'is always plaguing him.
If the physical universe is without mind, then mind must exist
as a thing in itself, and to that conclusion men will continue
to come as certainly as water will come in through the holes
of a sieve. They are wrong, of course, but they are forced to
be wrong in order somehow to-justify the indisputable evidence for the mental and spititual elementsin human life.
In their efforts to win back the mind which is separa't* from
11 be compelled to follow one of two courses.
fl
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The &st solution .is to go back to dualism and stand

tjme

utterly inbmpatible entities4side by -side, invoking magic or
the supernatural, to explain their interaction (this was the
position of the psycholo~st.William ~ c ~ o u ~ and
a l l is' today
the position of Joad). The alternativt solution, natural to those
convinced of the independent reality of mind, is to deny 'the
existence of matter; except as a construct or projection or crea.-!
. tion of mind, and we slide rapidly down into mentalism again.
+
The firm believer in the selfexistence of mind is also an
invcrted materialist sidce he also believes that matter cannot
think. Thus, in a recent Brains Trust, Joad disagreed with
, the medical man who asserted that the mind ceases to assimilate new ideas in old age because of hardening of the arteries. ,$
"Surely," said Joad, "we must distinguish between .the m i ~ d 4
and the brain. What assimilates new &actsis not the brain but
the mind. A piece of matter cannot kno'w anything, -cannot -[:
contain a fact, it can only move about. What .happens to ;the
brain cannot possibly affect the mind." To which the doctor
replied that i t was evidenti that Joad did not know .very much
about physiology.
Let us note one other consequence. There $isa sham fight
on. A battle between Tweedledum and Tweedtedee. It is
this head-on collision between the mechanistic materialists and
the .idealists. I r i s a useless and confusing procedure. They
are both right and they are both wrong. c he presuppositions
of b& are wrong. It is a mistake to prove to the materialist
*that mind exists as something over against matter. But it is
eqkally a inistake to prove that matter is mindless. The
mechanistic materialist has got to see that matter (in brains)
can think. The idealist has got to see that thinking, being real
enough, nevertheless never takes place except in brains. .
Now this is 2 dialectical solution and Marxism is a dialectical philosophy. Descartes splits the unity of thinking matter
and createi the thesis and anti-thesis of the opposites, body and
mind. This is a historical necessity and a phase in the development of science and thought. But it is not a final phase; It ,
creatqs insoluble contradictions. They are resolved, not eclectticaUjr by tying up mind and matter side by side, but dialectically, by a return to the original unity on a higher k
l
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identity of opposites," says Lenin, ?more accurately perhaps
their unity,. is the recognition of the mutually exclusive and
opposed tendencies in all the phenomena and processes of
- nature."' "The existence of two mutually contradictory aspects,
their, conflict and their flowering together into a new category,"
,
the essence of the dialectical movewrote - ~ a r x "comprises
ment."
In the new synthesis we embrace the manifold achievements
- of mechanistic science and idealist philosophy (and they are
great). We enrich that unity and we resolve'the contradictions. That is the Marxist as it is the biological and philosophical
solution of the Body-Mind problem.
- Marxism maintains the unity and interpenetration of oppo'sites &ch we &d in the concrete world. Pure matter is an
abstraction, and while it may be useful enough to abstract the
physical or mathematical properties of matter for 'practical
purposes, yet we must put what we have, on paper, orbin our
heads, separated from the more complex whole, back into that
whole when we have finished.
Not only is this true of livingathings, it is 'also true of the
physical universe which, to beAknown and understood at all,
has to be brought into close relations with living beings. As
- we have seen earlier, what we know depends largely, on the
r a g e of our senses, on what we actually do with things, on ' 'h e nature of our experiments, and on,the nature of our requirements. In this way, too, mind and matter interpenetrate
and an organic unity exists in all knowledge, a unity of knower
and known.
. ,
Out of the artificial dualism which we hqve criticized arise ,
not only mechanistic materialism and idealism, but a host of
philosophical 'aberrations, some of them of considerable popularity. They constitute the current philosophy of our times in
its idealist aspect and we not without social significance.'
We' propose to consider some idealistic consequences of
phil~&phicaldualism current today, - and to indicate their results in the social and.politica1 sphere.
,
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Firsdy, all that. is really meant by modern science is that the!:!,$.$$
-*+
nineteenth-century
view
of
matter,
at
the
~ltra-microMopiq
[@;
level, is out of -date. It no longei consists of hard, indivisible q.13
billiard-bdl-like atoms but ,of electrical phenomena. ~ u t
.-, I!:
,
neitlhn view has got anything at all to do with solidity on the.
:,,,
- -:#l e d of ordinary experience. On that level, matter is as*solid$~
-::$ as ever it was, it not only appeari to be solid, it is solid, it does q :r!q
,*:,-;
*
,.possess that solid reality which it appears to p6ssess." The -;+..
.$.-,*
scientist does not deny that however tenuous and irnpalp:L,.;,$:5p
: able the ultimate constituents of matter may be; the result *d;p
;'::tji
.:J,R~
in our man-size world is ordinary tables and chairs which j e >ti.
-.Q te,j~
scientist believes in like everybody else.
4 *? 91%:
'i"b;
i;prqatSecondly, however. tenuous and non-solid ultra-microscopic:.,;fcktG
Y@katter is found to be, it does not cease to be matter. Matter has -."
.?-$?:;4f
bgr#
T2
merely been further described. It has only ceased to be ma-
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mechanists, some philosophers "not only threw out the bath
water, but the baby as well. By denying the immutability of
the elements and properties of matter known hitherto, they
ended with the denial of matter, the denial of the objective
reality of the physical world." l6
Thirdly, from the lack of solidity on the ultra-microscopic
level, from the mathematical abstractions which help us to
understand matter at that level, and frorb the undeniable, fact
of -the relativity of our knowledge (that which we know depends on how we handle it, on our limitations, our conditions
of ,knowledge) they pass over into pure mentalism, as Joad
does, matter becomes "a projection from the consciousness of
tli'e perceiver."
•
But this does not follow. We have already*discussed- the'
. dependence of knowledge on the point of view of the knower
and s h o ~ n ~ t hdependence
at
does not rule out independence.
The argument is of sufficient importance to be recalled. That
the object exists independently of us is an unchangeable fact;
what it is exactly we know,only in part, in aspects, with .but an
approximate degree of truth. Thatwhat we thus know is true
as far as it goes we know because we act successfully on that
knowledge. So far from matter dissolving into mind, mind
remains that which possesses the characteristic of becoming
acquainted yith things other than itself, while matter remains
that which is known. Relativity does not lessen objectivity.
, All perception is a judgment of therenee. We do not infer
an object because we have a perception; perception involves a
judgment of external reality and needs no inference. We do
n~t-~erceiveideas, or abiitractions. We perceive something.
We thus refute subjectivism not by reasserting a naive, uncritical realism, not by going blindly back to .mechanistic
- materialism, but by taking up into our objectivism the subjective factors of knowledge. We come back to the objective,
world again but with a new conception of our relation to it,
which is-no longer that of a contemplative eye passively observing it, or a "spot-light" falling upon it to enable us to "read o f f
what is out there, but is that of an organic unity between
knower and-known. "Duality in unity is implied. in all experience," says James Ward, "but .not dualism."
,

'

It is doubtful if such views would ever have become so
widely held but for the fact that a breach in the walls of scientific knowledge may be expected to let in a host of phantoms
from the supernatural realm which may be taken fm realities.
If-reality is mind, then there may be mental or spiritual realities outside the physical universe, outside of space and time,
unknowable and unverifiable by the sense but accessible to
spirit through spiritual organs of apprehension or intuition.
This belief opens the floodgates to every form of superstition
and mentalism.
Instead of seeking out the scientific causes of disease the
rnamwho believes in the supernatural may attribute it to black
magic, or devils, or a punishment'from God. Instead of installing a water-borne sewage system, he resorts to prayer and
sa-crifice. Natives in Central Africa when they fail in their
primitive methods of iron-smelting do not try to find out what
technical error they have made, but attribute their failure to
someone having bewitched them. Superstition is therefore not
only a reflection of ignorance; it tends to perpetuate it. Eventually science is held to be something blasphemous. It is
irreligious to take out of the sphere of the spijitual or of Providence that which rightly belongs to it: Russian peasants under
the
Czar attributed famine not to sh?llov ploughing but to
*:l
-5 the Divine Wrath. They were taught to accept epid.emics as
a discipline of the soul. In India today superstition still obstructs social advance. Even in our owh country trade depression, wars, disease and poverty are often felt to be divine dispensations, or due to irresistible and inscrutable forces which it
is folly for us to seek to control and presumptuous to seek to
, understand.
If it should be contrary to the interests of any privileged section of the community to remove these evils, it will be seen
how the superstition which paralyzes map's efforts serves their
ends. In this fact we have, perhaps, one of the reasons for the
revival of idealism in an ige in which many social evils exist
and in which the remedies at hand conflict with vested
interests.
"Is it not odd," asks Stebbing, "that men should welcome, as
some do, any indication of unreason in the world?" No, it js
a
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phikmphers and scientists fromlMacha d Avenarius tb Bug- ' m and Vaihinger. 'Tbview is that science never gets be
yond its owq .perceptions and the more or less arbiv-&y ways
in which they are built up by the mind into scientific con-.
structs. These come, mistakenly, to -be regarded as external
objects and scientific laws. "All b o u g h the physical world,"
says Eddington, "runs as unknown content, which must raUy
be the stuff of our own consciousness. We have found that
where science has progressed the farthest, the mind has but
" regain~dfrom nature that which the mind has put into
nature." l7 Scientific laws and, in fact, thp whole scientific
description of the world, thus %cometo be a collection Of fictions or abstrations-which, to use an example of Eddington's,
no more describe the reality they stand for than ,the numbers
of telephone subscribers tell us anything about the subscribers
themselves. The theory, in some quarters, is extended to overthrow the whole notion of causation and scientific law and.to
substitute mere succession or ,observed regularities. Thus a
-wire glows when you pass electricity through it, but we must
not say that the electricity causes the rise in temperature, we
havk merely two events which frequently pccur together 'so
that thue is the probability of them doing so again. There can
be no ItCcessm connection between the so-called cause and
C ~ says of this whole *point of view, ."it
effect. As J O ~rightly
strikes the authentic subjectivist note."
It is a much older theory than most people suppose. T h e
first exhaustive criticism of it, indeed, was Lenin's Matcroa2ism
and Emp'rip.CriEicism, in which Mach, Avenarius, Karl Pearson, Ostwald, Poincar4 (the scientist) and the NeeKantians
come in for severe criticism.
Once again the issue cannot be resolved by head-on collision.
, The irrationalists and fictionalists have got something.
They are in revolt from a much too rigid rationalisrp and
from a naive "spot-light" view of scientific knowledge. Objects '
are not like a neat row of exhibits on a shelf which can be'
accuratelv labelled. Laws are not a collection of fixed and h l
legal twlis, which things,must obey, and which science looks,
. up and reads off in the great textbook of nature. "Cauie and ,
effect" in nature is not,the: same thing as the logical necessity
*
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by which the conclusion of a syllogism is reached. The. effect is
not in the cause as the conclusion is contained in the premises,
That kind of a mechanical universe n&er existed. It is correct,
,too, that all formulations are abstractions, freeze the flowing

,
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moment, selet an aspect from an infinity of possibilities. It is
true that in all knowledge the knower is so tied up with what
he knows that you cannot separate them. Knowledge, as we
have said, is an organic Yelation and a relation of selectivity
and activity, not a bare contemplative r8eflection.
But because the*mechanical universe of naive science does
not exist there is no need to abandon the objectivity of things
and the reality of laws. That, as Lenin said, is to empty out
the baby with the bath water.
All sich doubts are based upon the erroneous notion that
true knowledge is the perception of an external object which
is precisely what it is apart from *ourknowing it, "an intuitive
apprehension of the real" 5nd necessarily always infallible;
a i d it is also based upon the view that we ought never to rest ,
cpnterit with anything less than a full, coercive and infallible
knowledge. Once' this simple dogmatism is subjected to the
thoroughgoing criticism of relativism, the tendency is to aban- .
don it for sheer irrationalism.
But reality is not overthrown by its relational character but '
is so constituted. It is only the ghost of a strict rationalism
which condemns us to despair.
These criticisms"of scientific reality are due to the unavailing struggle to apprehqnd with logical certainty the structure of a finished reality as it stands over against a passive observer.
Once it is seen that reality can be truly if imperfectly known
only -as a construct in which mind and nature are partners,
then we shall see what while our claims to know may be
modest, they may nevertheless be firm.
Just as idealism refutes a naYve realism, so does irrationalism, but it goes too far. The mind, does contribute a great
deal to the scientific picture of reality, which is not merely
"read off." Hypotheses, models, fictions, categories, all imgy
mental activity, not a passive reflection of reality. But there is
a way of making sure that the element of construction inherent
itl our scientific thinking is valid, and not, as irrationalism be-

lieves, mere fiction. We do not only observe and think, we -,
experiment. "We can .test both our theories and the observation on which they are based by our success or failure in acting upon them. I£ our imaginary constructigns cannot be used
to anticipate correctly the results of our activities, they cannot
be valid. Experiment is an essential part of our means of die
tinguishing between constructions which are knowledge and
constructions which are merely efforts of the imagination. 18
Such experiment moreover is "not an appeal from thought to
perception but an appeal from reflection and imagination to
action, from theoretical experience to practical experience. 19
Irrationalism, however, is more than a philosophical error;
it has $e most serious social consequences.
- 1. Truth becomes anything we can get believed, any pattern
convenient to ourselves, into which we can force the facts.
The Fascist attempt to coerce the facts is a good example of
this.
- 2. On the other hand, if the universe is irration~l,nohonest
man can really have faith in any theory, since he knows it is
really only the shape his own mind puts upon events. The
economic and political theories of Socialism are not truths but
fictions, myths. Conviction therefore comes to depend not on
understanding reality but on faith. And that kind of faith
is not what men die for.
3. Finally, this view sees in the objective world only chaos
and lawlessness, since order and law. are simply the -mental
spectacles through which we choose to look. The 'conclusion
for every honest mind is to throw away the spectacles and
face the sheer brute irrationality of life, a creed of complete
despair. In a declining civilization torn with insoluble contradictions and distressed with hopeless paradoxes, chaos is of
course a fact, and that is why irrational theories of the woAd
and flights to realms of purely mental peace or supernatural
pe&ection are so common. But both reactions avoid the plain
task of understanding the world in its chaos, diagnosing its
evils and reconstructing it. Such theories are therefore pop*
with those who either cannot, or dare not, or will not, face
that task.
9,
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gqjnns, or a sciedtist were not quiie.~sure
lwhether magic or

,

ri;le.ehaniu should' establish the principles of a e r o P h con- .
, . :stmaion.
,
*.TheHarvard philosopher Santayana has devoted his greai
&fts to the cult of this form of idealism. His other-worldliness,
' his ascetic raptwe over pure beauty and the ideal world spring.from his discovery "in the heart-of metaphysGs of that pedec. tion he vainly sought in nature and in reason. He has come full circle to a Platonic insight that,looks upon all life as fleetink and imperfect and somehow unsatisfactory. He is at last a
'free soul,' bound to this earth by only the slightest of ties,
21
. ,zind ever ready to turn his back on these.
+.-This contemplative habit obviously finds more satisfaction,in
solitude than in society, in art than inbusiness, in prayer than
. in politics. It is stimulated by looking inwards, conternpla@vely;ratha than by looking outwards to see what needs to
be done. The world has not to be altered'but only understood
-by mystical insight, b? seeing 'all things under the form of '
- eterniiy.
- Such theories invariably afhm the superiority of the spiritual '
-.
over
the material. The more abstract and u n r d indeed, the .
.
&use satred the reality. The consequence is to give @e utmost
. imPOrta&e t o the non-red and little or no importance to the '
nreal.
The result is not on19 complete £utility, but in pursuing this
* .GQ-&the wisp such people turn away from and condemn.
.
eyery sine, rational and ..scientific approach to the problems
beforeathemas doomed to failure_becauseit neglects the spir- itual. Thus they drift into opposition to all scheqes and movements for social reform.
Fortunately most idealists are sufficiently inconsistent to at.,tempt to .make the best oflboth worlds, an attempt not, how- .
.- fever,-likely to succeed since 'their theories 'tend inevitably to
'
vitiate their saner and more rational impulses. What must be
-- the influence, for example, of *MISGerald Heard on his disciples? 'He comes forward as' himself the prophet or mystic
.
way to-the highe; life. Yet the loftier his' claims,
. ~q.mpletelv
empty of- content or reason do they.a p
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pear; the more woolly are his ideas, the more verbal his precepts. "we is &e neo-Brahmin. H e is, the pilot. He is the
antennae of the new society. He specializes in and communi;
cates spiritual power. He is in touch with the Source. I only
wish I could escape the impression that he is selling something
the nature of which, unfortunately, cannot - be divulged." 22 1
Once again the door is flung wide open to every form of self- .
delusion and garl la tan ism. Once the criterion of conformity
to external material reality, of experiment and practice, is re.
moved, literally anything can be exalted into a spiritual thingin-itself. The wise-and o o d exalt into mystical-realities the&
own wisdom and goodn&s, but the fool worships his folly and , ,
the villain his villainy. In fact, as Chesterton pointed out, long
.
ago,
"When Jones begins to worship the God within,' he usually
,
ends up by worshipping Jones."
There is anotherside to the cult of the non-material, and
that. is the degradation of the physical. Beginning with .Plato
the idealist tends, in separating consciousness, 'and with it
' human values, from the body to abandon the body to nonhuman, that is to say, animal propensities. If the higher life
is in the realm of spirit, it can,only be followed by turning one's
back on-thelife that belongs to the flesh, which is on a lower
- plane. It is a simple step to associate all that is evil in life with
the material or bodily side and all .that is noble with the
spiritual-as if there were not as much and more spiritual evil ' .
than bodily,! There follows the doctrine of original sin or the
innate corruption of human nature, the seat.of that corruption
being the flesh. What Plato left undone in riveting this heresy
upon men's minds St. Paul and st: Augustine completed. The
result today is that social evil is attributed not to error, or historical ca&s, not to economic or class interests but to the
ineradicable and inscrutable evil in human nature. This provides a welcome alibi for the real interests opposing reform,
spreads a pessimism and defeatism equally useful in preserv- ing the status quo and directs the whole of human effort to the task of purifying the soul-by breaking its links with the
world and its temptations, in other words to the task of lifting
- oneself by one's own boot-straps.
Much has been written recently to disparage that social effort
'
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which assumes that man cad behave decently. Social reformers, we are told, neglect man's inherent wickedness, attempt
ing "to explain his being and purpose on one plane." T h t
dualistic or religious view i s that man has being on two planes,
the material and the spiritual, and therefore needs redemption. 23
' . "Society," says Aldous Huxley,"can never be greatly impro;ed
until sdch time as most of its members choose to become theoceqtric saints." If our fathers had argued in this way few great
reforms would have been achieved. Today it is "calculated to
spread alarm and despondency in the k i ~ d sof men and
women of goodwill who will otherwise give their practical aid
and support to progrehsive social policies."24
This literary pessimism which i s widespread both in criticism and in credve work is a true reflection of the conditions
which.have shaped them. It is, philosophically, clearly related
to'irrationalism and subjectivism on the one hand, and to a
decadent modern theology on the other. A typical example is
the late Bernard Lord Manning, a modern Calvinist, starkly
opposed'to Modernism. His deepest dissent was from "the belie£ that man and his world are &d, that given a chance they,
will develop alright." What he stood for was "renunciation, not
amelioration, ,of-the world; transformation, not development,
,
of the individual."
The optimistic literature of the early Shaw and Wells, based
on the belief that man was essentially a rational and decent
creature, has suffered,shipwreck. Man will listen neither to
sermons nor to reason. His nature is'not fundamentally good
but evil, as the psycho-analysts have shown. The reaction begins with Hardy and Housman who viewed man as the sport
of Nature in some sense malignant:

And how am I to face the odds
Of man's bedevilment and God??

-

Lawrence found the human soul diseased, and his cure was
for trlan to become possessed not by a divine but by an inhuman will, or, as he put it, "to be inhumanly, physiologically,
materially, not to feel. according to the human conception."
Social collapse and frustration, the war and the appalling moral

dehac of the Axis peoples reveal man a an mpc tect and ,
sinful creature. Three writers - w b take the lid off humanity
are mentioned by Nicfiolson. They are ~ b ~ cwith
( ; his Catholic background, Kafka who wrote fantastic allegories or night,mares on the impotence of man, and T. S. Eliot. In all of
them is a Catholic.sense of sin, self-disparagement, defeatism,
loneliness, cynicism and pedantry. As Connolly says of Joyce,
"tortured with the lapsed Catholic's .guilt," we find .in him
"horror and delight in failpre." He has turned away from social
responsibilities, "I am afraid I am more interested, Mr. Connolly, in Dublin street names thah in the riddle of the Universe."
No one would question Joyce's influence .on, literature, his
eitremely sensitive auditory imagination, his enrichment of
language. His realism, too, pays the tribute of all devotees of
pure experience (from Mach to Bergson) to the unique value
and validity of each separate moment of consciousness. His
sense of the interpenetration of all moments of reality is not
only experiential and poetic but reflects Whitehead's view of
reality as process in which an infinite number of factors and
relations determine each fleeting event and "the world which
-we see about us is involved in some more intimate fashion
than is ordinarily supposed with the things that go oa.in our
minds."
Nevertheless, as Edmund Wilson 25 shows, this whole literary tendency reflects a desire to stand apart from the common
life and live only in the imagination-hot for the fruit of experience, but for experience +itself. Reflecting the decadence
of their class, such writers are "the last historians of .Heart-,
break House." Hence the "ineffectual fragmentary imagina,.
t i ~ nthe
, impotence and resignation of Eliot." 26
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This is the way- the world ends
Not with a bang but a whimper.

- ,
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There falls on literature a sullenness, a lethargy, a sense of
energies ingrown and festering, while poetry is dully weikhted
by a leaden acquiescence in defeat. Eventually, as Wilson
says, "literature, music and pdinting become the three branches
of neurology!'
(Eliot, defending classicism, Royalism ' and
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The social critiiis* of.such writers -"dops not aim at,
:. '
thing: it is an exercise ,of the pure intelligence not driven by
the motor power of .any hope .and not directed by any creative .imaginidon for the possibilities~~£
human 'life. If they ever
i d e a t e a preference for any social order differat £ram the
prc$eLt one, it is invariably for some society of the past."
Yet their achievement is considqable; They were coriqct' -in
,. .. . refuting the shallow optimism that foreww &an rightijng thc
4
universe by sheer power of will and-reason,man out of relation
to his claks or condition, man, taking no heed of deve1oPh@
>
&a1 *for& and declining institutions. They were right4in
'
.depicting society as disintegrating and corrupt. They were
right again in their disruption of mere miterialism aid naturgism, in welding body and mind in indissoluble unity.
They were wrong in isolating .man -as a mere point-intiant '
+ of 'experience, in forgetting the fact that man.without fellow.: s
*,
without membership in society, is. qdthfng. "Forsooth
brothers, fellowship is heaven; and lack of fellowship is hell;'
feI10wship is life, and lack. of feuow~hip~
is death; and the
. deeds,&at ye do upon.the earth, it is for fellowship's sake that
ye & dothem, and&! life that is in it, that 'live on and on for
: :ever, ahdl each one of you pan of it, while many a'man's life
xipn the ear& from the earth shall wane." - . .
'
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. Modern Magic

One of the inevitable results of draining everything but the
physical and chemical out of matter ahgl so reducing it to pure
mechanism is that it becomes quite impossible to accouG on
rational grounds for the objective phenomena sf life and mind
ahd for the evolution of the living out of the non-living. The
attempt to explain these away by reducing them to physical
terms is so hd~elesslvartificial that it immediatelv breaks
down. Now since ex kypmhesi the only material factors &e
mechanical and the only scientifically rational effects are calculable and predictable resultants, how do you accouqt for life,
and how do-you explain the evolution of totally new and un'

.
I

predictable types, such as the bird evolving out of a reptile?
There can be only one solution-a vital force must be at work.
But it is the whole aim'of the scientist to reduce such new effects fo law, to analyze until he has all the conditions and factors responsible for them. To invoke a vital force is to sabotage
investigation and scientists have been severe on the vitalists in
consequence. Biologists have strongly opposed the attribution
of evolution to this non-material mystical urge, this impart-of
pure spirit on pure matter. They have sought and, to a considerable and steadily increasing degree, found scientific causes
for evolutionary change, Where gaps in the causal chain are
still unbridlpd -the scientist does n o t immediately.postulate the
necessity for miracle but simply continues his investigation in
the faith that discoverable causes are there. He points cut that
it is precisely this attitude, in contradiction to baffled surrender
to vitalism, that has in the past solved innumerable similar
problems which would never have been solved if a supernatural
cause had been assumed.
Vitalism, however, arises from a mistake as to the real meaning of cause and effect. When Eddington declares that "no
today believes in scientific-determinismwhe expresses
-physiciit
the common irrationalist view that law is qnly a statement of
high probability baed on statistical averages and not, therefore,
a Gatement of.necessity. If this is the cask, then three important
results ,follow. Firstly, the door is. opened to the operation of
purely spiritual factors, thus vindicating the reality and independence of the non-material world. Secondly, an indefinite
&here is indicated outside the bounds of scientific understanding and control, within which will be included hunian conduct, society, politics and economics. 'Thirdly, science itself
w always been regarded by sciedsts as a higher
suffers. ~ a has
level of physical reality which explains the world as we find it
in experience. This new doctrine rejects that notion and asserts
that there are nothing but experiences or facts and that "laws"
merely summarize them for our convenience. The older scientific view was based on the theory that the
only kind of law or causal necessity was a'mathematical orf
logical one in which reasoa by itself can deduce the effect
from the kause or find the effect to be already in the cause, in

which case, of course, nothhg realiy new can ever happen.
.In so far -as vitalism shows this view to be inadequate, it
renders a valuable service. If everything that has happened
'was contained in the original physical order, "We ought then to
iekard the present state of the universe as the effect of its ante- .
cedent state and the cause of the. state that is to follow," says
Laplace in the classical statement of this position. Now this is
indeed the case in a great deal of mathematics and physics, a
simple example being the propositions of Euclid. But events
occur which are certainly not predictable in this way, for example, the color and other properties of chemical compounds,
the behavior of protoplasm, and so ,on. These effects are not
mathema'tical resultants. 'Are they therefore irrational? Are
they outside scientific causation? Are they merely inexplicable,
observed succession-given A then B always follows? only if
we accept a purely logical notion of reason and causation:
~ u ist this the real meaning of causation? Not at all. The
more modern theory of causation finds it not in mathematical
determinism lwt in all the conditions, internal and external,
which give rke to the effect, This effect is not antecedently
predictable, but after it has once been analyzed completely into
its conditions it is not merely probable, on statistical grounds,
but certain, necessary. Such an effect is, of course, something
quite new. It is not a resultant of the factors comprising the
cause. It is not on the level of the assembled conditions; it is .
the effect of their complete synthesis into a new whole, reirealing new qualities and properties. Cause &us becomes not a
matter of resultants but of emergence of the new, of genuine
creative evolution. Life itself is the best, though the most difficult, .example; The antecedent conditions do not contain life,
yet in the living organism there is nothing in the way of constituents but those which were originally non-living. The only
difference is the assembly and arrangkment or organization
of all these non-living -.constituents. Such an organizatibn is
a living organism. 1ts cause simply is all the factors and conditions. If there are no more factors to discover, there is no
additional cause to discern.
The vitalist who holds that an &Beetcannot differ from its
cause but must be contained ia it, and that the non-living can-
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uvmg, is' himself simply a mechanistic ma-.
inadequate view of .matter and a limited,
understanding of cause and 'effect. In fact,
usality by denfing that effect can be fundamentally different from cause. It is his own inadequate viewof causation which compels him ,toaccept only two possible
explanation's of the emergence of something new: (a) the new
must always have k e n in the antecedent conditions although .
it was not discernible; thus if life appears at some stage it must always-have be& present': -and.if mind appears later, it,
too, must always have been, present and therefore is an unseen
and undi~overablequality of all physical things; (b) the new
must come from outside the material as an invasion or injection from another world of life and mind.
Therefore neither the mkhanist nor the vitalist can explain
the emergence of the new in rational terms, because their conception of what 'is rational, of what is "explanation" is inade- ,
quatea-What' needs to be done is to revise the conception,of
scientific explanation until it is competent to cover crqativity
in nature. Creativity was not possible on the basis of the
earlier view of scientific exphation, and yet nature is one
succession of novelties and is creative though and through.
Marxism has always held firmly to the thewy of integrative
levels and qualitative change while denying the need of vitalistic interference. Mgrxism is wholly at one with modern science,and modern philosophy in this approach, which escapes
from the dilemma by avoiding the original error of dualism,
.which denied the capacity for life and change to matter.
Marxism finds! a sufficient explanation firstly in the, infinite
potentialities of matter; secondly, in the self-movement of
matter; thirdly, 'in the repatterning of matter as it seeks ti,
adjust internal to external 'relations and as it develops its own
various aspects in organic relation to its environment. This is
sufficient to:account for the evolution of all the successive and
infinitely varied types of existence, 'including Eving forms,
thinking animals, social types like man, and eventually of
'society itself.
Vitalism, however, is not o n l i a scientific but a social heresy.
It helps to reinforce Ithat attitude to the contradictidns and
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pro!Aam of societywhich places them ocyond'rational cqn;rd.
It encourages belief' in the existence of 'unconscious urges and
: blind irrational forces.
An age of increasing contradictions and social paradoxes, in
which poverty and plenty increase together, and want seems
actually to be created by the same system .that is producing
wealth to an unexampled degree, in which war and economic
slump descend on the peoples, like natural calamities, is an
-*
age in which men will-feel themselves increasingly to be the
, ' s p r t of forces they can neither explain nor understand.
But a vigorous attempt to find a rational solution is bound
to discover economic causes for poverty, unemployment and
. war which are rooted in the system of class ownership and can
,
only be finally ~emovedby ending it. Since such a solution r
is unwelcome both to those who profit by the jratus quo and by.
those who t,hink they might, and since the rest are economically .
dependent upon the ruling class and derive their ideas largely
provided by it, the result
from the education and
will be a flat refusal of the mind eves to entertain the possibility of radical reform.
It %thusbecomes as impossibl= to understand or control social phenoqena as it would be electrical phenomena if we
began by refusing to acknowledge the existence of ele'ctricity.
There is an obsession here which can only be explained psy'
, chologically. The urge to fly from the truth at all costs drives
.thepind into every kind of fantastic and supernatural explanation and resort. ,,Hencethe popularity of astrology, mysticism
and every kind of superstition today.
, The result of the c6lapse of Europe's spiritual and social
'
dr&r, says Drucker, is that mei turn to miracle. The final
defeat of reason and order was the failure first of capitalism
and then of orderly liberal reform. There*
man is convinced that the world has nb order and follows no law-the,
forces which govern society have become irrational, therefore
, miracle is the only way out and he will believe in nothing'
else.
"The 'conventional lie' of a society divided 'into classes' asqsumes proportions which are aH the more extensive according
as the existing order bf things is endangered through econo~ic
,
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evolution and by the working of the class struggle which is
the outdme of that evolution. Marx said truly that ehe greater
the development of antagonisms between the growing-forces
of production and the extant social order, the more does
the ideology of the ruling class become permeated with
hypbcrisy 2s
Our ancestors invented the supernatural to give them faith
in a world of perils which they could not control. It was
both understandable and excusable. Moreover, superstition 5:
was mingled with empirical facts of some value. It was not
impossible to progress through partial and inadequate understanding to science and rationalitj.. In our day we sin against
the light. With all the achievements of science in our hands
weoturn back to magic. This wilful reaction is &thological
and its effect mental disintegration, the cult of unreason.
' Now ;he rational buttress of irrationalism is that form- of
idealism which we call vitalism, is that failure to\ explain
change which describes it as "statistical regularity" because law
is no longer believed in. '
Thus does a false ideology support a reactionary social attitude and confuse, paralyze and discourage the activity of
thought in the solving of economic and political problems.,
. What is already a well-marked sympton of the modern niind
in the English-speaking world has long been the predominant
philosophy of both Italy and the Third Reich. On the-one
hand an exaggerated idealism reducing the historical world
to pure, unalterable :Idea" in which the individual holds a fixed
and completely subordinate place. On +e other, the repudiation of reason, and a complete surrender to primitive instinct
as the short cut to reality. The more morbid- forms which
idealism and irrationalism, particularly in Germany, have
taken, are too numerous to mention, though of great
interest. 30
Otto Spann is simply Hegel without his dialectic and withoht his revolutionary dynamics. Taking the capitalist system
as i t ' i s with its false ctitegories of the market, employer and
employed, over-production, 'supply and demand, financial
stringency, it regards these as unalterable laws of an unchanging whole, logical necessities in which man is forever trappkd.
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The world is not, as it was for Hegel, a selkhadging, selfemancipating whole but a permanent condition of slavery for
mankind-a st'atic caste system, the corporative state.
Klages, the apostle of instinct, exalts animalism as fundamental life force which determines the nature of society. Every
animal devours and expects to be devouted. All social theories
which assume a different principle for man are beside the
point. The life force in social life is that tribal spirit which
completely swamps and embraces all individuals. The indi.vidual surrenders himself and his reason to the tribe and mass
.feeling. In getting rid of the individual we also get .rid of all
'
those awkward doctrines of the rights of man, justice, equality,
humanitarianism, and democracy, which stand in the way of
the privilege and absolute authority of the bosses of the Fascist
state.
"Fascist thought is. thus in continuous oscillation between
the two poles of Vitalism and Totalitarianism. Both succeed '
'
in establishing that which is the main requirement of Fascist
philosophy-lhe'concept of a human society that would not be
a relationship of persons." ".
It is clear that Idealism under the constraining influence of
'a society in disintegration in which the ruling classes are determined at all costs to resist social change does not remain
a mere intellectual error which we might regard with disinterested tolerance, it becomes a powerful weapon of reaction,
a mental poison which by reinforcing Fascist 'policies and
weakening- resistance to them, by inhibiting the mind against
polrcies of rational and hopeful reconstruction, becomes a powerful ideological ally of the worst forces of corruption and
selfdestruction in the modern world.
And this whole philosophy of reaction in its various phases
*arises theoretically from an artificial dualism. "Throughout '
the Universe there reigns &e union of opposites which is the
ground of dualism. Whenever a viciqus dualism appears, it
is by reason of mistaking an abstraction for a final fact." 32
The universe is dual because each final actuality known to
us is both physical and mental. But if we lose the unity in a
divided universe, then out of the false dualism arises as one
pole that mentalism or idealism which is the source of our
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modern superstitions and irrationalisms. To bring about

fundamental causes is that superstition has taken so firm
effect a restoration of unity.
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